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Abstract
This work aims to identify and quantify the biases behind the anomalous behavior of
people when they deal with the Three Doors dilemma, which is a really simple but
counterintuitive game. Carrying out an artefactual field experiment and proposing
eight different treatments to isolate the anomalies, we provide new interesting
experimental evidence on the reasons why subjects fail to take the optimal decision.
According to the experimental results, we are able to quantify the size and the
impact of three main biases that explain the anomalous behavior of participants:
Bayesian updating, illusion of control and status quo bias.
Keywords Three doors anomaly  Cognitive Bias  Bayes equilibrium  Probability 
Decision-Making  Field experiments  Artefactual experiments  Behavior 
Bounded rationality
1 Introduction and Literature Review
‘‘Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three doors:
behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say No. 1, and
the host, who knows what’s behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which
has a goat. He then says to you, ‘Do you want to pick door No. 2?’ Is it to your
advantage to switch your choice?’’1 The optimal choice, switching to pick door No.
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to do not behave accordingly. This is the case of the famous TV show ‘‘Let’s Make
a Deal’’, in which a presenter (Monty) and a participant play a game called the
‘‘Monty Hall’s three doors’’. It is a really simple but counterintuitive game, in which
there are three ordered doors. Behind these three doors, there are, respectively: one
prize (a luxury car) and two non-prizes (goats). The participant is supposed to find
the prize (a luxury car) that is hidden behind one of the three doors. It is a two-stage
sequential game as follows:
(1) The participant chooses one of the three doors, and the door is left closed;
(2) The host opens one of the two left doors with a goat behind;
(3) The host asks the participant to decide whether to keep his initial door or to
change it with the other closed door.
At this point, the intuitive thought of the participant could be that it is indifferent
whether to keep staying or switch. However, following the Bayesian probability
theorem we know that this intuition is wrong, and the optimal choice should be to
switch. If one keeps his initial door, the probability of winning remains 1/3, as it was
in point (1), while in case of switching the probability rises to 2/3. Despite it seems
quite straightforward, most people seem to do not consider this conditional
probability but makes often the wrong choice.
The Monty Hall problem has been deeply studied across several fields, from
mathematics, psychology, physics to economics. Even though it seems a simple
probabilistic game, it is hard to explain the systematic and self-determined irrational
behavior of the major of participants. The debate is still open, and it seems to be an
endless problem. The choice of not switching, reducing dramatically the probability
of winning, could be caused by different reasons. Friedman (1998) focuses his
reasoning on four main factors: (i) gambler’s fallacy, (ii) endowment effect, (iii)
probability matching, (iv) Bayesian updating.
Through gambler’s fallacy (also called ‘‘illusion of control’’ by Camerer, 1995)
participants are self-convinced to be able to controlmore than they really can, showing
some intuitive skills in choosing themost likely door with the prize behind.Moreover,
a kind of endowment effect bias can be found in explaining the anomalous choice.
Since a participant already chooses one of the three doors, when he is supposed to
decide whether to switch or to stick, he would not switch because he considers his
initial choice as the endowment, without considering it as a sunk decision.2 It seems
that people ascribe more value to things merely because they already own them.
Another important behavior that comes out from the experimental design of Friedman
(1998) is the probability matching behavior, that is an anomalous and irrational
behavior through which people choose according to the likelihood of each alternative
rather than the real most likely one. Despite all these three already mentioned reasons
are very relevant in explaining the reluctance to switch the choice, even though it
should be the most rational one, there is another fundamental problem in the Monty
Hall dilemma, which is considered to be themost important by the literature in various
fields: participants fail in Bayesian updating. When the initial choice is made and the
2 See the ‘‘Sunk cost fallacy’’: Arkes & Blumer, The psychology of sunk cost (1985); the ‘‘Prospect
theory’’: D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, (1979).
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information of the empty door is given to the participant, the Bayesian probability of
winning is 1/3 for the initially picked door and of 2/3 for the other alternative. People
seem to do not notice this updating of probability, or they are not able to understand
this simple but counterintuitive problem.
On this wise, Franco-Watkins et al., (2003) state that human reasoning does not
always adhere to the formal rules of logic. For instance, the expected utility or
Bayesian theorem fails to be effective in reality. Baratgin (2015) noticed that people
often use subjective Bayesian reasoning for solving complex problems in which
different solutions can be envisaged depending on the interpretations made by
participants.3 Hence, one may think that the Monty Hall anomaly is all about a
problem of the misunderstanding of Bayesian probabilities or subjective conditional
probabilities. In reality, it may be not the case, or better, it is not the unique cause
that leads to the anomalous behavior of participants. For this purpose, experimental
studies have tried to modify the original Monty hall game proposing several
treatments, trying to capture different effects according to specific control variables.
Many experiments attempted to address this unsolved dilemma. By employing an
iterated version of the game, Palacious-Huerta (2003) showed that different monetary
incentive amount, individuals’ initial abilities and social interactions affect the
learning individual and group behavior in Monty Hall problem. They found that, in
earlier stages, the more able students make the optimal choice (on average with a
switching rates of 18 percentage points in the first 5 rounds) respect to the less able
students.Moreover, individual interaction along rounds incremented the probability to
take the right choice. On the other hand, Franco-Watkins et al. (2003) ran three
different experiments to study—in the first two cases—if choice behavior and
probability judgements can be influenced by learning from another simulated game
similar to the Monty Hall problem (a card game) and—in the last one—if changes in
the number of doors and in the amount of prizes can influence participants behavior. In
the first two treatments, they found that participants learned the switching strategy in
the card game, and some applied it to the Monty Hall dilemma, perhaps they were are
not able to soundly motivate their strategy. Thus, they get just implicit knowledge of
the game, indeed they did not understand that switching is the theoretical optimal
solution to increase the likelihood to win. From the last treatment, authors found that
subjects portioned their probability judgement on the basis of the number of prizes
over the number of unopened doors. Continuing, Morone and Fiore (2008) tested
whether the Bayesian updating bias disappeared with a treatment ‘‘for dummies’’ in
which participants were not supposed to compute any probability updating. However,
although the share of switching behavior has increased, the irrational behavior of not
switching did not completely disappear. Thus, the Monty Hall anomaly is not only
linked to the limited capacity of Bayesian updating but other reasons, mainly
psychological, play an important role in the choice of participants. According to
Morone and Fiore (2008), the ‘‘status quo bias’’ could have an effective impact on the
anomalous behavior of players. People seem to attribute a higher value on the initial
choice, probably because they feel their choice as an initial endowment, and their loss
aversion makes them surer in case they do not switch the initial choice. Participants
3 See the ‘‘Sleeping Beauty problem’’, Baratgin and Walliser, 2010; Mandel, 2014.
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give more value to their choice, only because they think they own them, and this
justifies the fact that at least 15% of the experiment participants never decided to
switch. Finally, Petrocelli and Harris (2011) studied the linkage between learning,
counterfactual thinking, and memory for decision/outcome frequencies. Their main
result is that subjects are reluctant to switch doors. The counterfactual thinking4makes
learningMonty Hall problem more difficult, because it puts subjects in the position to
do not understand the optimal choice, especially when the premium increases. At the
same time memory for decision/outcome frequencies makes learning the actual
associations between switch decisions and winning and stick decisions and losing,
difficult to understand.
To the best of our knowledge, literature lacks paper which (i) jointly remove both
the Bayesian updating and the illusion of control biases and (ii) account for a
different game solution.
We provide an artefactual field experiment, carried out in a mall in Bari (Italy), to
isolate the different reasons behind the irrational choice of participants.
2 Experimental design
We conducted an artefactual field experiment in a mall in Bari (Italy) in October
2019, interviewing a total amount of N = 681 subjects.5
In the questionnaire (see Annex 1), we have six socio-demographic questions.
The last question concernsMonty Hall’s three doors. In all eight treatments we have
three boxes and only one of these contains a prize, i.e. a 10 € banknote the other two
boxes are empty.
In T1, the Control treatment, subjects were asked to choose a box among three
and an empty un-chosen box was subsequent opened. Then, we asked subjects if
they want to switch their first choice with the remaining un-chosen box. In this
treatment are presented the three biases discussed in the previous paragraph:
• the illusion of control: subjects believe that they may understand which choice is
better and they consider the first choice as the most likely;
• the status quo bias/endowment effect: subjects seem to give higher value on their
first choice, maybe because they are loss averse and because they think they own it;
• the Bayesian updating: the opening of the empty box creates new information
i.e. the probability that the first chosen box contained a reward was 1/3 and it
was stead, at the same time the probability that the open box concealed the
reward became 0. Finally, the probability that the last box had a reward was 1/3
and it became 2/3.
T2 is identical to T1 but we removed the Bayesian updating. Also, in this
treatment, subjects were asked to choose a box among three, but in this treatment,
4 In that case, an upward counterfactual thinking (i.e., simulating alternatives that are more desirable than
reality; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993) has been applied.
5 N = 80 in T1, N = 72 in T2, N = 88 in T3, N = 79 in T4, N = 96 in T5, N = 88 in T6, N = 87 in T7
and N = 91 in T8.
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no boxes are opened after the subject choice and, then we asked subjects if they
want to switch their chosen box with the other two boxes. In this treatment are
presented only two of biases discussed in the previous paragraph:
• the illusion of control;
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
In T3, subjects were assigned one box among three and then one empty box is
opened, and we asked subjects if they want to switch their assigned box with the
remaining not opened one. In this treatment, only two biases are presented:
• the Bayesian updating;
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
T4 is identical to T3 but we removed the Bayesian updating. Subjects were
assigned one box among three and then we asked them if they want to switch their
assigned box with the two remaining boxes. In this treatment, there is only one bias:
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
In T5, subjects were asked to choose two boxes among three. Then, an empty
box of the two chosen boxes is opened and we asked subjects if they want to
switch both their chosen boxes with the remaining box. In this treatment, there
are all biases:
• the illusion of control;
• the Bayesian updating;
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
In T6, subjects were asked to choose two among three boxes. We asked subjects
if they want to switch both their chosen boxes with the remaining box. In this
treatment, there are only two biases:
• the illusion of control;
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
In T7, subjects were assigned two boxes. Then, an empty box of the two assigned
ones is opened and we asked subjects if they want to switch both their assigned
boxes with the remaining box. In this treatment, there are only two biases:
• the Bayesian updating
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
Finally, in T8, subjects were assigned two among three boxes. Then, subjects
were asked if they want to switch both their boxes with the remaining box. This
treatment presents only one bias:
• the status quo bias/endowment effect.
In Table 1, we summarize the biases that are present in each treatment:
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3 Experimental results
We start the analysis by exposing an overview of the results (Fig. 1) and, for the
sake of soundness, we compare the baseline scenario with those of previous
literature (Table 2). Fig. 1 shows the share of subjects who made the optimal
decision in each treatment.
As it can be observed, there are interesting differences across all the eight
treatments. To grasp the size and the effect of removing each one of the three biases
which could explain the irrational choice of subjects, it is useful to analyze the
difference between performances comparing paired treatments. Moreover, to get
clearer information from the data, it would be better to group the treatments into two
categories, each according to the same optimal strategy for the treatments inside the
group. For this reason, we compare the results within the first four treatments
grouped (T1, T2, T3, and T4), in which the rational choice is to switch and the
biases go in the opposite direction of the rational choice, and within the last four
treatments grouped as well (T5, T6, T7, and T8). As a general result, comparing the
results between both groups, one can see graphically that there exists a big gap
between the performance of the first group and second group. This is because in the
first four treatments subjects can maximize their probability of winning if they
switch but the biases go in the opposite direction pushing then to stay; hence, it is
harder for subjects to being right respect to the second group of treatments. In the
latter, in fact, the decision that maximizes their probability of winning goes in the
same direction of the biases.
Starting from T1, the control treatment in which all three biases are present, the
share of subjects who took the optimal choice is 10%. This means that 90% of
subjects behaved irrationally. It is interesting to compare this result with the results
in previous literature. To this purpose, in Table 2, we show the percentage of
subjects who decided to switch in the first period across several experiments, when
the original Monty Hall’s treatment has been proposed to participants.6
Table 1 Treatment summary table
Treatment Optimal choice Bias
Illusion of control Endowment effect Bayesian updating
T1 Change 4 4 4
T2 Change 4 4 9
T3 Change 9 4 4
T4 Change 9 4 9
T5 Stay 4 4 4
T6 Stay 4 4 9
T7 Stay 9 4 4
T8 Stay 9 4 9
6 In case of repeated games, we report the result of the first period of the experiment in the similar
treatment.
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We additionally provide a two proportion Z-test to compare the statistical
significance of the differences evidenced (see Table 3).
Moving from T1 to T2, we observe an increase of 17.78% (p-value = 0.034) of
the percentage of the optimal choice. Hence, we observe an increase of rationality
Fig. 1 Percentage of optimal choice per treatment
Table 2 Observed switching frequency in previous study. *Experiments refer to the standard version of
the game
Experiment* Sample % of
Switching
This experiment 102 non-student subjects from a Mall in Bari 10%
Friedman, 1998 104 students at the University of California, Santa Cruz and
at Cabrillo Community College
10%
Palacios-Huerta, 2003 217 undergraduate and graduate students in Economics at
Brown University
14%
Petrocelli and Harris, 2011 57 undergraduates from Wake Forest University 21%
Franco-Watkins, Derks,
Dougherty, 2003
142 undergraduate students of the William & Mary College 22%
Morone, Fiore, 2008 20 students from University of Bari 35%
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once the Bayesian updating is removed. This positive effect appears also when we
take away the illusion of control. Comparing the results between T3 and T1, in fact,
the 35.23% of subjects took the optimal decision, respect to the 10% in the control
treatment T1. The difference of 25.23% (p-value 0.001) is caused by illusion of
control.
Another important aspect that we aim to understand is the impact of eliminating
both Bayesian updating and illusion of control together. This effect is captured
taking the difference between the means of T4 and T1, which is 25.44% (p-value
0.0001). Hence, removing Bayesian updating and illusion of control together
positively and significantly improves the performance of subjects. Since in T2 we
isolate Bayesian updating, in T3, the illusion of control bias, and in T4, both these
biases together, it can be interesting to see whether the effect of removing Bayesian
Fig. 2 Percentage of optimal choice per treatment and sample type
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updating (T2) and illusion of control (T3) one by one is equal or not to the effect of
removing both together (T4). To test this difference, we create a third variable made
by the sum of T2 and T3, and then we compare the mean of this new cumulative
variable with the performance of T4. We reject the null hypothesis (p-value 0.0008),
concluding that the Bayesian updating and illusion of control are not cumulative
Table 5 Logit regression with robust standard errors
Dependent Variable = optimal
choice

































































Age – 0.065 (0.096) – 0.012
(0.017)
Gender: Male – 0.206 (0.215) – 0.037
(0.039)
Education 0.082 (0.135) 0.015 (0.024)
Self-employed – 0.229 (0.319) – 0.042
(0.058)
Housewife – 0.083 (0.283) – 0.015
(0.051)
Retired 0.484 (0.385) 0.086 (0.066)
Student – 0.396 (0.452) – 0.073
(0.083)
Unemployed – 0.262 (0.737) – – 0.048
(0.117)
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.208
Observations 681 681
Note that the marginal effects for factors level is the discrete change from the baseline level
***Refers to p-values\ 0.001, while other cases report a p-value[ 0.10. Reference categories include
Treatment 1 in the reduced form and, additionally, female and employed in the complete one
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biases. Even though we expected a larger share of rational choices in T4 than T3 and
T2, the ratio of subjects taking the optimal choice in T4 was not statistically
different from the other two treatments, suggesting that a significant share of
subjects may be affected by more biases. In particular, the observed frequency of
rational choices in T4 is lower than expected, and this indirectly confirms that
subjects are affected by more than a bias only. Hence, we can argue that there could
be an overlapping of biases, in this case, the Bayesian updating and illusion of
control. It is important to notice that in T4, there is still present the status quo bias,
which is harder to detect and to isolate. For this reason, we can assume that the
residual of the irrational behavior that is still present, also after eliminating illusion
of control and Bayesian updating, can be attributed to the status quo bias. We will
now analyze the second group of treatments, and we compare the two groups. There
is a huge gap and a common pattern between the score of the first four treatments
(best strategy switch) and the last four (best strategy stick). This could be mainly
explained because the task is easier since there is a double choice, and biases go in
the same direction of the right choice of subjects. Comparing T5 with T6, we
observe that the impact of the Bayesian updating is negligible ( – 5.52%) and not
statistically significant (p-value 0.400). This happens because in making their
decision, subjects already choose two boxes among three; hence, it is easier for them
to understand the Bayesian dynamic. Thus, keeping or leaving the Bayesian
updating does not affect the result if it goes in the same direction of the right choice.
Things are different in T7, which is specular to T3, in which we isolate the illusion
of control. In this case, the difference between T7 and T5 is – 15.52% and highly
statistically significant (p-value 0.015). We can conclude that removing the illusion
of control negatively affects the subjects’ performance. In the last treatment, T8, we
eliminate both Bayesian updating and illusion of control together (as we did in T4),
and this leads to a statistically significant drop of the percentage of the correct
choice respect to T5 ( – 11.90%, p-value 0.052). Moreover, comparing the
differences between T5-T6 and T7-T8, we can assess the impact of the Bayesian
updating in this group of treatments. Previously, we stressed that Bayesian updating
does not play an important role in this group of treatments, because the difference
between T5 and T6, – 5.52% (p-value 0.40), is not statistically significant. This
result is confirmed looking at the difference between T7 and T8, because the
performance varies practically for the same size, – 5.39% (p-value 0.819), that in
turn is not statistically significant.
All in all, we propose a logit regression model to (i) summarize the results
outlined in Fig. 1 and (ii) to control the effects of age, gender, education and
employment status. We propose two versions of the results. In Table 4, we separate
the regressions in accordance with the optimal strategy to be adopted, since as
discussed before, it is possible to observe a different behavior. Specifically, from T1
to T4, the removal of biases improves the ratio of optimal choices, while from T5 to
T8, biases removal leads to a reduction of it. Hence, we investigate if there is a
relation between the diversity of outcome and subject personal traits. We propose
two versions of each model: a reduced form, considering only the average treatment
effect and the complete form, including the aforementioned socio-demographic
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characteristics. We also report the marginal effects to enhance the interpretability of
the results. In Table 5, we repeat the analysis considering the full dataset.
As it can be noticed, different levels of age, gender and employment status do not
lead to a significant variation in the optimal choice ratio. All the average treatment
effects discussed above are confirmed by the regressions performed. This aspect is
evident in both Tables 4 and 5. Moreover, Table 4 confirms the evidence described
above: in the first four treatments (T1–T4), the removal of biases favors the
identification of the optimal choices (as it can be noticed by observing the positive
sign of the coefficient associated to T2, T3 and T4), while in the latter block (T5–
T8), the removal of biases makes it more difficult to identify the optimal choice. For
completeness, we check whether personal characteristics might be specifically
related to a particular bias (i.e. to a specific treatment). Results are not different,
enhancing the robustness of the abovementioned consideration (see Annex 2).
4 Further extensions
In the proposed artefactual field experiment, the selected sample is heterogeneous
and considers different population groups. It might be worthy to investigate how
different skilled subjects’ respond to the proposed dilemma. We repeated exactly
the same experiment using an online platform. We administered questionnaires
addressing it to specific groups: (i) students (417 participants), (ii) former students
(21 participants) and (iii) experts in the economic area (172 participants). An
incentivized (a) and a non-incentivized (b) classroom experiment was carried out,
respectively, while for the third case, a non-incentivized experiment was admin-
istered through the Economic Science Association (ESA) mailing list. At the end of
the data collections, for the incentivized (a), one of the students was randomly
chosen and he/she won the prize of 10 euros. Figure 2 summarizes the main results.
Focusing on T1, the control treatment in which all three biases are present, the
share of subjects who took the optimal choice was 10% in the artefactual field
experiment, in these other experiments, we can observe a homogeneous behavior
among subjects, except for the expert sample (67%). The percentage of optimal
choice is 9% in the non-incentivized experiment, and 17% in the incentivized one.
In all the other treatments, we cannot observe a significant difference in choosing
except for the non-incentivized former students and the expert subjects. The former
students show a less understanding of the game, they have the worse percentage of
optimal choice per treatment. The experts seem to recognize the Monty Hall
problem and its resolution, they choose the optimal choice in both Treatment 1
(67%) and Treatment 3 (67%). This allows us to assume that experts are not affected
by illusion of control but when we remove the Bayesian updating for them is less
easy to recognize the theoretical game. Considering the other treatments, from T5 to
T8, we can confirm expert awareness about the game as they identify ‘‘stay’’ as
optimal choice, as well as the ability of the other two groups. Thus, it is easier to
recognize the optimal choice when it goes in the same direction as biases.
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5 Conclusion
The main goal of our experiment has been to identify and quantify the biases behind
the anomalous behavior of people when they deal with the Three Doors dilemma.
We provide an artefactual field experiment, carried out in a mall in Bari (Italy), to
isolate the different reasons behind the irrational choice of participants. According
to the experimental results, we can quantify the size and the impact of three main
biases that explain the anomalous behavior of participants: Bayesian updating,
illusion of control and status quo bias.
Our main considerations have been clear: the biases may be overlapping,
indirectly confirming that subjects are affected by more than a bias only. As we can
see from the results, we are not able to isolate and detect the status quo bias (T4 and
T8); for this reason, we can assume that the residual of the irrational behavior that is
still present, also after eliminating the other two biases, can be attributed to this one.
Another important observation is that in the second group of treatments, in which
the right decision is to stay, we registered higher percentage of optimal choice, this
is because, subjects already choose two boxes among three; hence, it is easier for
them to understand the Bayesian dynamic. Thus, keeping or leaving the Bayesian
updating does not affect the result if it goes in the same direction of the right choice.
Testing this anomalous behavior of people when they deal with the Monty Hall
dilemma, we wanted to verify if socio-demographic aspects could have some effects
on the subjects’ decisions. We can affirm that different levels of age, gender and
employment status do not lead to a significant variation in the optimal choice ratio.
To conclude, we investigated how differently skilled subjects’ respond to the
proposed dilemma. We repeated the experiment addressing it to three different
groups: experts, incentivized and non-incentivized students.
From the results emerge two important aspects. Experts know the game and make
the right decision, even if when the treatment is not the traditional one, they are able
to reconnect it with the theoretical game. Thus, it allows us to suppose that they are
not affected by the illusion of control bias. The other important aspect is that non-
incentivized students perform worse in almost all the treatments compared to the
other groups.
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Annex 1
Annex 2
In this Annex we report, for each treatment, a logit model checking for the existence
of a possible statistically significant relation between the optimal choice and
personal traits. As it can be observed, there are only some isolated cases of
statistical significance with regard the occupational status, since employed
(reference category) performed better in T7, while there is no age, gender and
education effect. It is difficult to draw some conclusions from the effect found in T7
where the illusion of control is removed, since in the correspondent treatment T3 the
same effect for employed people vanishes. Likewise, this effect does not exist in the
treatment of the same block (T5–T8) Table 6.
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